The Security Agenda: Proliferation and Terrorism

We Face Urgent Security Issues, Poorly Positioned for Near-Term Progress
We are in a period when there is an unusually large number of serious security issues on the world’s agenda, and we are in a relatively poor position to deal with these issues. I will give you my list of those issues which are most pressing and most urgent.

• First, the collapse of the economy, and to some extent the government, in Russia.
  
• Second, Trilateral countries’ engagement with China. I fear that this week as we meet here in Washington, D.C., the United States is about to take an untoward turn in the way it seeks to engage China.
  
• Third, North Korea and its continued efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.
  
• Fourth, Iraq and the failure of the U.S. policy of containment.
  
• Fifth, Iran. There is no agreement among Trilateral countries about how we should engage Iran and there is a growing antipathy towards the U.S. practice of sanctions. To my mind, unilateral U.S. sanctions have proved largely futile.
  
• Sixth, now that we have NATO troops in Bosnia, and perhaps soon in Kosovo, how do we get those troops out?

And there are other issues as well. Let me remind you of the issues of (1) drugs and international crime, which are the most serious issues for the public; (2) India and Pakistan, where nuclear stability is most fragile; (3) Greece and Turkey; and (4) the Middle East peace process. This is an overwhelming agenda of issues to deal with as Trilateral countries.

Let me next ask: Are we well positioned to make progress on these issues? My judgment is that we are quite poorly positioned to make progress on these issues in the near term. Why? First, U.S. leadership has been and will be constrained for the foreseeable future because of the political difficulties of President Clinton. Europe for the time being has turned inward, in my judgment, stressing their interest in economic and political integration at the expense of trans-Atlantic cooperation. The economic difficulties in Japan have slowed the process of having this great nation take a greater leadership role in world affairs. And, finally, the international economic instruments on which we rely, the IMF, the World Bank, etc., have neither the resources nor the instruments to deal with the difficulties that we asked them to address, for example, the economic collapse in Russia. So I conclude that we should have very modest expectations about the progress that can be made over the next couple of years.

Proliferation and International Terrorism
Among the agenda of issues that I mentioned to you, there are some common features. One of those important common features is the joining of proliferation and foreign terrorism. Let me just mention to you three possibilities we should worry about. First is the loss of weapons or material—nuclear, chemical, or biological agents—from the Russian military complex. Second is the development of biological agents—anthrax is the most likely—by sub-national terrorist groups that release them in Trilateral cities. Third is the acquisition of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by rogue states—the top two countries on the list are North Korea and Iran. These kinds of threats have new features which I want to mention to you.

The first new feature of this threat is that there is an international character to terrorist activities which has never been present before. It is illustrated by the activities of Osama bin Laden, who managed to strike two embassies in two different countries in Africa at the same time; and then the retaliation by the United States against Osama bin Laden’s operations in two countries—Afghanistan and the Sudan—on two different continents. Islamic terrorist organizations operate in capitals throughout the world in a concerted matter. This state of affairs is very different than that which existed in the past.

The second new feature I have already mentioned—the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by these terrorist groups. We have the example of the U.S. conviction that Osama bin Laden’s organization had been seeking to acquire and develop chemical agents in the Sudan; there is also the evidence of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo’s efforts to release a nerve agent in the Tokyo subway system.

And a final common feature is the new element of the great vulnerability of the computer and telecommunication system on which our economies and our societies become progressively more dependent. These are vulnerable to penetration and to destruction. It is especially difficult to tell a difference between a threat from state actors, sub-national actors, and criminal groups.

All of these are tremendously different threats that deserve attention.

Now, it is worthwhile to ask: How serious are these threats—are they real—and what are their origins? Those questions are indeed connected. The answer I believe lies in the realization that the United States and its Trilateral allies are increasingly engaged around the world and hence the target of terrorist groups that have no other way of accomplishing their political or economic agenda. In the long-run the only way to prevent this kind of terrorism is to address the social and political concerns—the causes of unrest which lead to the desperation and criminal fanaticism of groups operating in otherwise happy and peaceful nations. But until we can address those more fundamental concerns we are going to have to deal with these threats of foreign terrorism and related proliferation concerns.

Needed Actions by Trilateral Countries
I want to mention a set of actions that I think should be taken by Trilateral countries because today, in my judgment, we are woefully unprepared to deal with this threat. Let me give you five specific things which I believe Trilateral countries should be doing:

• First, we need to provide greater assistance to Russia to manage their decaying weapons complex and help them get over their economic difficulties. I speak here of everything from helping them build plutonium storage facilities to acquiring highly enriched uranium more rapidly. Until now, the United States has been launching these programs and bearing the costs. I believe it is time for it to become much more of a Trilateral activity.
  
• Second, as Andrei Kokoshin mentioned, we need new initiatives on export controls, especially in the areas of biological and chemical technologies which can lead to weapons. I believe that this approach should not be on general prohibitions against dual-use technology, but rather targeted on specific transactions which are known to have a degree of risk.
  
• Third, the United States and most of the Trilateral countries are very ambiguous about whether foreign terrorism should be dealt with as a law enforcement matter or as a national security matter. Until that key issue is resolved it is unlikely that we will make very effective or efficient progress. It must be resolved if we are going to deal with these catastrophic threats that can involve the penetration of national computer networks which control banks, power plants, or air traffic control systems. It must be resolved, in my mind, in favor of seeing these as key national security threats.
  
• Fourth, we must build the capacity to deal with the consequences of catastrophic terrorism, should it occur. There is almost no city in the world which has the ability to deal with the medical consequences of a chemical or biological attack. We must have the training, the equipment, and the technology to deal with these possibilities.
  
• Fifth, we must have a shared intelligence capability among cooperative countries to warn of potential attacks and to build understanding of the mode of action and activity of terrorist groups. We should also seek to act jointly where appropriate to interdict terrorist groups before they attack and retaliate when appropriate.

All of these are very important actions that deserve to be taken jointly by Trilateral countries. The United States is making progress in these areas; it is developing its own programs in counter-terrorism and infrastructure protection. But much can be said for improving our international cooperation so that we share the benefits of our knowledge and technology and reduce the costs of protecting our societies against the threats of catastrophic terrorism and proliferation. At present, the international cooperation among Trilateral countries is inadequate. It is based either on a sequence of bilateral relationships or on multilateral mechanisms that were designed for other purposes and are much too small to address this very big job.

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Let me conclude with the following observations. First, the threats of catastrophic terrorism and proliferation are real. Second, there is much that needs to be done to reduce the risks and improve our defenses against terrorism. Third, there is a major imperative for improving cooperation among the Trilateral countries in this fight.