The Future of Trans-Atlantic Security Cooperation

First and foremost, NATO remains the bedrock of EuroAtlantic stability. And at its core collective defense will remain the anchor of our common security. Having said this, we must also acknowledge that the Alliance has to further adapt to a fast changing security environment. We need to be better prepared for the risks and challenges we are to be dealing with in the foreseeable future. That is paramount to maintain NATO as the most effective and flexible politico-military instrument for maintaining peace and stability in and for Europe.

My second thesis is that to reinforce the transatlantic link we need to strike a new bargain between Europe and America. History has taught us that our fates are inextricably linked. In the world of yesterday, Europe played the central role in US defense planning. In today’s and tomorrow’s world, the Europeans are becoming more and more important as allies and partners in a wider context. However, Europe is not yet the strategic actor it is seeking to become nor the global partner America is looking for. Partnership in leadership requires a Europe willing and able to take on more responsibility.

Third, to meet the challenges of the 21st century and the security agenda ahead we need to utilize all and each of the EuroAtlantic institutions. Each institution has its strengths and offers specific benefits. They all have to work closely together towards our common political goals and shared strategic objectives.

II.

Since 1989 we live in a world that is changing faster than ever before. It is requiring us to adapt our minds and institutions. Yesterday’s world provided us with grave, but well-defined challenges. The world of today and tomorrow is much different: A wide range of ill-defined risks calls for a wide variety of highly flexible politico-military instruments. Consensus between the main players is conditio sine qua non. But consensus is now harder to achieve—since there are more players on the field than ever before and there is less time to coordinate their varying interests.

NATO has, undoubtedly, been adapting faster than any other institution of the Euro-Atlantic security network, but there is also no doubt that the Alliance still has to go a long way. Its 1991 Strategic Concept was written for a world much different from today’s—it was written for a world in the midst of dramatic transition. It provided the framework for NATO’s double enlargement—for building up ever closer cooperation with partners, tailored to their specific needs, and for dealing adequately with new missions such as conflict prevention and crisis management.

The internal and external adaptation has already been extensive. NATO is cutting down the number of headquarters from 65 to 20 and force structures are changing rapidly. The Alliance now successfully conducts operations such as in Bosnia and Kosovo. It has forged strong ties with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and this in itself has brought about a fundamental change in the security environment. And NATO has made a big step by successfully institutionalizing its cooperation with Russia and Ukraine.

At the Washington summit we will not only celebrate the 50th anniversary of the most successful politico-military alliance the world has ever seen—not least by welcoming the leaders of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. We will also agree on a new Strategic Concept, outlining how to contend with new challenges and new opportunities. For an Alliance that is capable both of meeting a wide range of threats to our common values and interests and of working in trusting partnership with other nations and organizations. For the only alliance capable of promoting security, prosperity and democracy in and for the whole EuroAtlantic area. The new Strategic Concept must keep the right balance—affirming the fundamental capability for collective defense and at the same time providing for the full range of future conflict prevention and crisis management tasks.

It is essential:

• to implement the new command structure fully and rapidly,
• to appropriately improve the Alliance’s military capabilities and force structure,
• and it is essential to establish a more operational relationship with our partners.

The success of the April summit will depend not least on the decisions taken on these issues.

Reliable and, therefore, politically meaningful collective defense and crisis management capabilities are based on proper material conditions. Developing key capabilities is especially important in that area where we are facing greater demands—in the ability for rapid and decisive crisis management. The number one key capability is interoperability. It is based on a common strategic and operational understanding of our soldiers which we need to develop further. Interoperability, furthermore, demands flexible organizational structures. And, last but not least, interoperability requires state-of-the-art matériel. The German armed forces have already gone a long way to adequately tailor forces to the mission, deploy them rapidly and sustain them in the field. But this is a challenging undertaking requiring constant effort.

And this, by the way, reminds us once again of the pressing need for restructuring our cooperation with the defense industries in Europe and America alike. Here as in other fields, the benefits of cooperation are in the long run greater than the revenues of acting independently.

III.

To meet the security challenges under the new auspices we must pursue a twofold approach—strengthen NATO’s political cohesion and military cooperation whilst enhancing Europe’s ability to assume responsibility when and where European security interests are involved.

We Europeans must increase our political weight in international affairs—as a part of trans-Atlantic solidarity and of a more balanced sharing of burdens. At present we lack both the joint political will and the instruments to take on greater responsibility. But both are necessary to live up to the challenges of the 21st century.

We will create the required politico-military decision-making structures in the European Union. This will allow for joint action to be taken in European crisis management under one roof. The first step is to appoint a European High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy—and to provide him/her with the instruments for the early detection of crises, including strategy planning and early warning facilities.

But this will not suffice. We aim for a more ambitious initiative: integration of the West European Union into the EU soon. Practical ideas on how this could be done are being developed in such a way as to implement them within the next two years. The rapid merger of WEU and EU would guarantee and provide the essential prerequisite for an effective and efficient European security and defense policy.

We have no intention at all to duplicate NATO. The military command and force structures must remain within the Alliance. Nevertheless, I feel there is a need for us to start thinking about the European members creating a strategic reconnaissance capability, as well as a strategic air transport component available for independent European operations—supplementing the corresponding U.S. capabilities within the integrated NATO structure. They are operational necessities for Europe to take action within the NATO framework and also under the auspices of the European Union.

Of course, the last we aim at is to sever the European decisionmaking process from NATO nor do we want to discriminate anyone. On the contrary, we want to strengthen the European pillar within the Alliance to the benefit of the EuroAtlantic security architecture as a whole.

IV.

The end of Europe’s political division has brought less spectacular, but more diversified risks to the fore. And it has raised both the necessities and the possibilities to improve fundamentally the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The EuroAtlantic community is meeting new challenges more than ever before together with partners, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, but even far beyond—and by means of close cooperation between the various institutions bearing responsibility for EuroAtlantic stability and security. We should not underrate, but instead underline that NATO continues to contribute immensely to this task.

The “Partnership for Peace” Program and the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council play major roles in building confidence and trust—not only between the armed forces of NATO and its partners, but also between their peoples and governments.

And the Alliance’s relationship with Russia is a key element in shaping a peaceful and stable Europe. What we are looking for is active cooperation on issues of mutual interest. The Permanent Joint Council is working now and constitutes a major step forward in shaping a constructive partnership between the new NATO and the new Russia. Strengthening the trans-Atlantic ties on the basis of shared values and common interests is fundamental to European security—and the basis for the indispensable reaching out to a Russia in transition.

There is, however, still much room for improving the ties between the various EuroAtlantic institutions. In Bosnia and Kosovo we see that close cooperation between NATO, OSCE, the UN and the EU is paramount for creating basic conditions for regional security and stability. We need to follow this path vigorously.

The challenge is to respond politically and militarily to multidimensional contingencies and to utilize for specific tasks those institutions that are most fitting. We have to prepare for the need to take decisions on a case by case hasis, because in future—unlike in the past—the response to any such contingency cannot be determined in advance or be automatic. That requires a common effort to develop all the EuroAtlantic institutions to the best of their abilities.

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This is the path to follow in order to master the ambitious security agenda set for both of us—Europe and America.