The New Central Asia: In Search of Stability

We have chosen to focus primarily on the states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). These states are a unified region largely because of their common Soviet past. But they are all in a state of flux, internally and in their external orientation. They are also increasingly seen as part of a larger whole, the Caspian Basin for energy or Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “Eurasian Balkans” in warning of the potential of widespread conflict and instability.

We have also found it necessary at times in this report to range beyond our defined region and speak of Azerbaijan and, less frequently, of the other states of the Caucasus, Georgia and Armenia. Yet we believe the narrower focus of our report is justified because it is not about energy or conflicts alone but rather the region’s increasing integration into the wider world, its potential for both stability and instability, and Trilateral interests in the better outcome.

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The authors of this study agree on several key points. The first is that a new Central Asia is emerging, one that will reflect its Soviet past for decades to come but cannot return to it. Over time, this new Central Asia will be linked to the wider world, through air, land, and rail routes, as well as oil and gas pipelines. It will be linked by common cultural ties, but also divided—perhaps violently—by them. It may also be linked by the narcotics trafficker and the refugee. For some time to come, these countries will be marked by weak states, weak economies and weak civil societies. They will be seeking some form of return to the Islamic world, though its form remains murky. The outcome of these trends could well be very different for each state. Russia will continue to play an important role but no longer that of the sole or dominant power. The new Central Asia will be part of a highly differentiated geopolitical space, with China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and India interested and engaged.

While the direct impact of these potential internal and external developments for Trilateral countries may in the near term be slight, their indirect impact could be profound and will increase over time. As parts of this region become integrated into the wider world, Trilateral stakes will grow. The region will have a profound impact on Russian and Chinese stability, identity and interests in the coming century. Regional conflicts could draw in outside powers and thus exacerbate larger Eurasian tensions. Such conflicts could also spill over into adjacent regions of primary significance to Trilateral countries, such as the Persian Gulf.

The Trilateral states could well play a decisive role in this region as a force for economic opportunity, global integration and stability. These states could play this role precisely because no Trilateral country sees this region as a zone of vital interests. Trilateral energy companies seek to develop the oil and gas found in the region. Trilateral governments want these countries to cultivate economic reform, a moderate and open Islamic culture and the political pluralism that is the engine for both. Yet no Trilateral state will make this region an area of primary focus. The derivative importance of this region is a great advantage in defining Trilateral policies for a regional “engagement without confrontation.”

Elements of a Common Approach
The overriding concern for Trilateral countries in this region has to be stability. The costs are high in the long run if weak states, corrupt gangs in and outside government, ethnic tensions, and outside aggressors make the region an exporter of tension and instability, rather than oil and gas. Stability in this context does not mean acquiescence to the status quo, but neither does it mean ignoring the new Central Asia’s existing political and economic structures. The best overall policy is one of consistent and purposeful engagement with the region over an extended period. Such a policy has to begin with helping to address the region’s pressing social needs and securing a healthy economic foundation for the development of oil, gas and other natural resource wealth.

A lack of vital interests in the region could tempt Trilateral policies to one of two unwelcome extremes: the first is an “oil and gas only” policy, one willing to sacrifice the region’s long-term economic and political improvement for short-run deals with the current regimes; the second is an abstract and unengaged preaching to states and societies in crisis of the virtues of Trilateral political forms and markets. Neither the cynicism of the first course nor the self-righteousness of the second is likely to lead to a better outcome for the region.

The first task for Trilateral decision makers is to be wary of imposing a false unity on this part of the world. It is not a single region. While broadly Islamic, these countries are not of a single ethnic, cultural or religious tradition. Energy development will be a key economic factor for many, but not for all. The weaknesses of state and civil society are widespread, but they are in fact forces for continuing decline and differentiation, not regional unity. The expansion of political, commercial and security ties with the outside world will bring further differentiation, as individual countries and sub-regions interact with China, Iran, Turkey and other Eurasian states. Russia is a player but no longer the region’s destiny. Trilateral strategic planning needs to expect highly differentiated internal development and external interactions. One could easily imagine this region becoming a mixture of internal successes and failures, as well as splitting into two or three distinct geopolitical sub-regions. None of our shorthand labels for the countries capture this dynamism....

Addressing Internal Sources of Instability
The immense human, societal and governmental needs of the region also create opportunities for greater Trilateral cooperation and for broad-based efforts that include Russia, China, and partners from the Islamic world. The shocking decline in public health and education, the decay or even absence of basic transportation and other social infrastructure and the emergence of a wide range of religious and social organizations create targets for Trilateral assistance. A broad range of public health and civil society programs would both meet real needs and foster a lasting link between Trilateral countries and the populations of these emerging states.…

Heading Off Regional Rivalries
Though many Russian observers see Trilateral, particularly U.S. and NATO, policies as aimed at supplanting Moscow, both the range and intensity of NATO’s security cooperation effort fall far short of any active competition. In fact, on security matters, Trilateral policies, particularly U.S. and NATO Partnership for Peace efforts have actively sought Russian cooperation. Russian military involvement in the region, the holdover of neo-imperial attitudes and a decided decline in Moscow’s influence there create enormous challenges for Russian policy, as well as resentment of outside actors.

However, if a core security problem for both Russia and the Trilateral countries in the near term is the stability of still weak states in the former USSR, a substantial basis for security cooperation exists. Stabilizing Russia’s weak neighbors ought to be a core element of Trilateral policies toward Russia, for a weak and unstable neighborhood will present distractions, challenges and temptations to a still weak and changing Russia. Ensuring that China’s engagement in the region continues to be a stabilizing force is also a priority.

• The authors of this study agree that NATO has assumed a visibility in the region out of keeping with its real influence there. The new central Asia is not a Euro- or Euro-Atlantic region but an inner Asian one. There should be no attempt to shut NATO out of the region. NATO’s Partnership for Peace offers some of the best-funded and most successful military-to-military programs in the world. Yet NATO activism in the region might easily be misunderstood or deliberately distorted to harm Trilateral interests.
• Over time, Trilateral efforts have to focus on blending security cooperation with emerging regional security patterns and institutions. The region as a whole knows few successful multilateral security arrangements.…
• Specifically, Trilateral countries should support the formation of a Central Asian Roundtable as a means to encourage senior-level dialogue between Trilateral countries, states of the region and key neighbors like China, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Such a roundtable could be built around senior leaders in the region, like Presidents Karimov and Nazarbayev, and serve as an encouragement of transparency and cooperation on political, economic and security assistance, as well as provide a more solid framework for addressing regional conflicts.…

A Long-Term Energy Strategy
Energy resources can divide or unite the region. Properly developed, they make internal recovery more likely. However, they could also be the source of continued corruption and economic decline. The authors of this study believe that energy development, including the important goal of pipeline diversification, is and should be primarily an economic matter. However, the geopolitical aspects of these issues cannot be ignored.

• Trilateral governments should be active supporters of pipeline diversification. This will include upgraded or new lines across Russian territory, such as the major pipeline planned by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium from Tengiz to Novorossiisk. It will also include non-Russian routes. The Baku-Supsa line is already in operation. The Baku-Ceyhan line is a plausible major pipeline, especially if greater efforts are made to make it as economically viable to Trilateral financiers and energy companies as it is geo-politically interesting to some Trilateral governments. Pipeline routes through Iran should not be ruled out. In the long run, an eastern route should be welcomed, given long-term East and South Asian energy trends and the great pressure these will put on existing sources.
• To the extent possible, the partnerships formed by Trilateral energy companies to develop and transport energy resources from the new Central Asia ought to include Russian and Chinese energy firms. A strong dose of economic competition and cooperation is the exact anecdote needed for those who see only geopolitical rivalry and a new “Great Game.” Trilateral countries have an interest in seeing growth in the number and influence of Russian stakeholders in Central Asian energy development.…

Conclusion
These policies seriously pursued are not the be-all and end-all for the new Central Asia. This region’s future is in local, not Trilateral, hands. But Trilateral policies can make a difference in hastening the process of the region’s political and economic integration with the wider world. They can contribute to the emergence of cooperative patterns and mechanisms of interstate relations. They can help bring about a solid economic foundation for long-term prosperity and a reversal of trends that threaten economic and societal decline. No short-term vital interest compels such a Trilateral approach to the region, but long-term trends in the region make it a prudent and inexpensive option. The authors of this study hope that Trilateral governments will see this opportunity to promote long-term stability and positive change in the new Central Asia and take it.