Korean Developments and Broader East Asian Cooperation

Han Sung-Joo

The following remarks were made by Han Sung-Joo to the 2000 annual meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Tokyo. Han Sung-Joo, former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University in Seoul. Shortly after the Trilateral Tokyo meeting came the announcement of a summit meeting in Pyongyang in June between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-il.

I was debating whether I should address the broader issue of East Asian cooperation or focus on one aspect of the report that has just been introduced. As a person coming from a small country, I decided to do the latter. My starting point will be what the report calls the “Grand Bargain” among China, Japan, and the United States, especially in connection with cooperation on third-country issues. Obviously, in this case, the third country is Korea, and North Korea in particular.

Common Interests of the United States, China, and Japan
The United States, China, and Japan have been cooperating with regard to North Korea. This is the result not so much of a bargain—grand or not so grand—as of a convergence or confluence of interests among these three countries. I’ll list some of these common interests:

• First, all three countries are interested in maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula—that is, preventing military conflict.

• Second, all three countries are interested in de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula and, more specifically, in preventing North Korea from developing and possessing nuclear weapons and limiting North Korean development of missiles. China has as much, if not more, interest in limiting North Korean missiles as the United States and Japan, since North Korean missile development would place all parts of China within the effective range of North Korea. Moreover, as is happening now, the North Korean missile program gives justification for the theatre missile defense or national missile defense programs of the United States and Japan in Asia, programs that China is very sensitive about.

• Third, the three countries are interested in containing and preventing any catastrophic collapse of North Korea, with the certainty of instability and high costs that will accompany such an event.

• Fourth, the three countries are also interested in not letting relations among themselves be adversely affected by what is happening in North Korea, and in not letting North Korea become a source of competition or strife among them, as Vietnam once had been. I can report to you that the United States felt quite relaxed when South Korea normalized relations with China back in 1992. And I think China feels reasonably relaxed about the possibility of normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States.

• Finally, I think the three countries share an interest in legitimizing the status quo—although the status quo is expected to evolve—and that is to give a stamp of recognition to the current situation, including the division of the country. The Soviet Union, later Russia, established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1991; China established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992; the United States and Japan are yet to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, although talks are going on.

South Korea and North Korea Change Course
Right now both North Korea and South Korea are, in effect, regardless of their intentions, cooperating with these three countries to promote the interests that I have just illustrated.

The South Korean position, as represented by what is known as the “Sunshine Policy,” has reversed—or at least altered—the previous South Korean position that any talks, dialogue, or relationship between North Korea on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other should be pre-conditioned by prior progress in North—South Korean relations, or at least in parallel with improvement in North—South Korean relations. That is, the current South Korean government of President Kim Dae Jung has removed that condition. Back in April 1993, when I was in government and played a role in facilitating—or allowing, so to speak—direct talks between the United States and North Korea over the North Korean nuclear issue, the opposition and criticism that I encountered then in Korea is quite a contrast with the acceptance of this “Sunshine Policy” today in Korea. In fact, South Korea is encouraging the United States to lift economic sanctions on North Korea and encouraging Japan to normalize relations with North Korea. South Korea even talks about the desirability of possible Japanese compensation to North Korea, of specific amounts of compensation. So South Korea is taking a long-term view of unification. The President recently talked even of the hope of having North Korea in APEC, whether this is a realistic prospect or not.

At the same time, North Korea, after much hesitation, seems to have decided to change its course, both in domestic policies and in external policies. Domestically, they have accepted some elements of a market economy. They are even undertaking some limited IT education, as I understand it. They are also interested in reforming agriculture and in training their people in business as well as administration. They have established diplomatic relations with Italy; they are talking about normalizing relations with Canada and re-normalizing relations with Australia, France, and Germany; and they are talking with Japan and the United States regarding establishment of official relations. With China, they have exchanged visits by Foreign Ministers and they are discussing a possible exchange of visits by their respective leaders, President Jiang Zemin and Mr. Kim Jong-il, who is the de facto leader of the country. North Korea has also improved relations with Russia.

So North Korea does recognize the need to change its course and it now has the opportunity. Obviously North Korea is feeling the need acutely, not only because of the severe shortage of food and energy and other commodities, but also the growing gap between North Korea and the rest of the world, especially with South Korea. As I was listening to the debate this morning regarding Japan, I was thinking about how much progress South Korea is making in the IT industry and new business ventures. North Korea, using Mr. Masayoshi Son’s formulation, is still struggling in the agricultural and industrial revolution stages of development, while South Korea is already making good progress in the information revolution stage.

But there are constraints on the way that North Korea can change its course. There is systemic rigidity. The military sector is not cooperating, partly because they are resistant to change, but also because they don’t want to give up weapons of mass destruction, which is always an obstacle to improving relations with the rest of the world, particularly the United States and Japan. The North Koreans are still suspicious of South Korean intentions, thinking the offers or proposals are bait for a Trojan horse. The difference is that if in fact it is a Trojan horse, North Korea will know it is a Trojan horse, so it can take care that it does not hurt them.

In addition, South Korea is really afraid of taking over North Korea any time soon. If North Korea collapses, it will do so because of its own failings, not because South Korea instigates the collapse, or tricks it into having relations with South Korea. So the dilemma still stands for North Korea: whether to change its course and open itself to the outside world, or not. What North Korea has decided to do is to open itself to the rest of the world without doing the same thing to South Korea.

But there is also a dilemma for the other countries. If the other countries do not want North Korea to collapse soon, they might inadvertently contribute to North Korea’s collapse by providing it assistance and increasing relations. But if North Korea does not establish relations with the rest of the world, it will face economic crisis even greater than it has encountered so far. And that is going to be a great danger for the regime.

Strengthened Regional Cooperation
What is the implication of all of this for the region? I think we are, or least we might be, getting a handle on North Korea. It is not likely that North Korea will provoke another crisis with the firing of missiles, as it did two years ago. And North Korea has given the opportunity for the countries in the region—China, Japan, and the United States as well as China, Japan, and South Korea—to coordinate their policies and to cooperate on North Korea. As North Korea joins, as I expect it will, not APEC but the ASEAN Regional Forum, it will open the possibility of bringing North Korea into East Asian cooperation.