East Asian Security and the International System

Despite the accomplishments, the region stands at the precipice of an unprecedented arms race. Moreover, a serious breakdown of the regional order would have global implications. Until recently, the region’s major patterns of alignment reflected competition and alliances arising outside the region. As an arena of international interaction, East Asia was more acted upon then an actor. But today, the region is no longer dominated by global bipolarity, and its patterns of cooperation and competition are no longer imported from other regions.…

The Grand Bargain
During the 1970s and 1980s, through a process of extensive dialogue and mutual accommodation, China, Japan, and the United States gradually reached an implicit Grand Bargain covering Taiwan, the security architecture in East Asia, third-country issues, economic relations, and human rights and governance….

Conclusion: Strategic Choices and Policy Recommendations
The central strategic question is whether the Grand Bargain has outlived its usefulness. Have the many changes made it irrelevant and irretrievable? Three basic views can be discerned in answer to the question, each with different policy implications for the Trilateral countries.

One view is that the underlying shared strategic interests that brought China, Japan, and the United States together in the 1970s and 1980s have not appreciably diminished, though perhaps the economic reasons for cooperation have increased in saliency, serving as a substitute for the prior focus on the Soviet Union. China’s rise, clouded with uncertainty, and Japan’s temporary economic difficulties have not altered the benefits to regional stability that a strategic partnership among the three brings. Proponents of this view would argue that the alleged strains upon the Grand Bargain are more perceived than real and that secondary issues have been allowed to clutter an agenda that should focus upon primary and vital interests. Further, they would say, a principal reason for the lack of strategic vision has been an unnecessary and even dangerous failure to sustain a meaningful and intense dialogue about a regional security architecture that would serve the interests of all the major powers. In short, adherents of this school call for a return to basics: a focus on major-power relations, renewed strategic dialogue, use of transitory issues to consolidate the major-power relations, and vigorous leadership on national security issues.

A second school argues that the changes—especially China’s rise—are fundamental. There is no way, they believe, that China can be effectively integrated into the global and regional system. They assert that China inevitably will challenge both the global and regional systems, and therefore that the United States and Japan should begin now to make preparations for the inevitable rivalry that looms ahead. To supporters of this view, whether the Grand Bargain once made sense is a moot point. To some in this school, it once had utility; to others, it created the conditions that present the Trilateral countries with the current dilemmas. But in either case, the attempt to return to it or even to adjust it to new circumstances is unrealistic and indeed dangerous. In short, proponents of this school seek what might be called a “new realism.”

We find both positions to be inadequate. Russia’s collapse; China’s rise; the trends of democratization, marketization, and regional interdependence; Asia’s growing importance in world affairs and the revolution in military affairs do require substantial amendments and adjustments to the old formula. But it is far too early to jettison arrangements that have brought unprecedented stability to the region. Indeed, the prescriptions that the “new realism.” offer appear eerily similar to the failed “rim strategy” of the 1950s and 1960s—i.e., relying on security arrangements with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian nations to contain and thwart China’s alleged malevolent inclinations. The strategy failed when the strategic balance was more favorable to the United States and Japan than it is today. And the strategy rested on an American capacity to compel Western Europe and Japan to follow Washington’s lead. That condition no longer exists. Moreover, the policy seems likely to lead to the very consequences that it posits when in our view such pessimistic assumptions are unwarranted and may be avoided.

Our preferred strategy is for the Trilateral countries and their Asian partners to refurbish the Grand Bargain. This entails expanding the earlier accommodations to address an altered set of issues.

Taiwan
First of all, changes in the Taiwan situation must be recognized by all the Trilateral countries, for its dangers threaten everyone. In the past, the United States carried the burden on the Taiwan issue almost alone. While the military dimensions remain the American responsibility, Western Europe and Japan should play a more active role diplomatically, politically, and economically. Hence, all the Trilateral countries should speak frankly to China’s leaders about the consequences of an unprovoked attack against Taiwan, namely that the response would be China’s diplomatic isolation and an outpouring of support for Taiwan. But Taiwan’s leaders should also understand that a formal declaration of independence or the enshrinement of its status as a sovereign Taiwan state in its constitution or a new basic law would receive no support from any of the Trilateral countries. The responsibility of the Trilateral countries, each in its own fashion, is to foster an environment that will facilitate improvements in cross-strait relations.

Part of that responsibility must be to explain to China’s leaders the implications of Taiwan’s democratization. Because the original Grand Bargain was struck without prior consultations with Taiwan, Taiwan’s past authoritarian leaders had no choice but to accept the arrangements that the major powers made on their behalf. That situation no longer exists. Many conversations will be necessary before the leaders in Beijing fully comprehend the implications of this change. It is clear that the leaders on Taiwan will have to secure the assent of their electorate to any accommodation they might reach with the mainland. For China’s leaders to hear the message from other than Americans will improve the likelihood of its being understood.

Due to its historical legacy, the United States is inescapably more deeply involved in the Taiwan issue than other Trilateral countries. Washington’s embrace of Taiwan’s new administration should be conditioned by its performance. Will Chen’s rhetoric, policies, and appointments merit the external support that he needs? Rather than enacting the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which mandates increased Taiwan–American military cooperation, or deciding now, for example, to provide Taiwan with significant new weapons systems, it would seem prudent for Washington first to judge the temperament and disposition of its new partner. After all, one boards a bus only after knowing its destination.

In short, precisely because management of the Taiwan issue is so central to the continuity of the Japan-U.S-China constructive triangle and because that triangle is fundamental to regional and global peace, all the Trilateral countries should recognize their stake and make their positions clear to both Taiwan and Beijing. While the military dimension must remain an American responsibility, the Trilateral countries should shoulder a greater diplomatic burden than in the past.

Strategic Dialogue
We recommend reinvigoration of a wide-ranging strategic dialogue among the leaders and their national security advisors of the region. Opportunities must be given, in private and unrehearsed bilateral exchanges, for leaders not only in Beijing, Tokyo, Washington, and Moscow but also in Seoul, Taipei, and Southeast Asia to discuss their fears and aspirations. And the Europeans should be active as well. Much of the dialogue should center on how to balance and reconcile the strong desires to maintain sovereignty, national independence, and cultural distinctiveness with the equally strong recognition of the need to create more effective international, regional and national institutions to deal with the new set of problems arising from globalization of economies. No nation has a monopoly of wisdom on how best to address these conflicting objectives. And it is important for each set of leaders to sense that their views have been heard and respected. The strategic dialogue should not be seen as primarily a task for the leaders’ foreign policy principals in Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo, as in the 1970s and 1980s. It should be expanded to various multilateral and bilateral occasions. The preeminent leaders of the major powers can not allow their domestic agendas to overwhelm them and divert their attention from strategic issues.

Korea
The Trilateral countries have a common and huge stake in maintaining stability and promoting peaceful evolution on the Korean peninsula. This was recognized in the financial commitments that the Trilateral countries make to supporting the Korea Energy Development Organization’s (KEDO) provision of light water nuclear reactors to North Korea. Should North Korea unambiguously embark upon a path of domestic reform and opening to the outside world, the Trilateral countries—in cooperation with South Korea and China—must be ready to respond to the opportunities that present themselves. The Grand Bargain arose, in part, to facilitate maintenance of stability on the Korean peninsula. Its partners now may have the opportunity to extend its purpose to the incorporation of North Korea into the region as a constructive member.

Arms Control. In contrast to the Soviet-American strategic relationship or the European theater in the Cold War, arms control has not been on the East Asian agenda. Limitation of weapons acquisitions and deployments were not part of the Grand Bargain; arms control negotiations did not encumber the reaching of mutual understandings in the 1970s and 1980s. But it is no longer possible or desirable to keep these issues off the agenda. Indeed, their inclusion seems essential to avert a debilitating and destabilizing regional arms race that no one can win.

There should be no illusion about the difficulties entailed. There is no multilateral forum through which to address the issues involved, nor can one be formed. Until the Korean peninsula ceases to pose dangers of war, it is somewhat premature to place limits on deployment of weapon systems and forces that are intended for Korean contingencies. And the uncertainties over China’s future course impel a hedge or insurance policy in terms of American preparedness and deployments that makes imposition of limits on American force posture difficult to conceive. We do not have specific proposals to make. Rather, we pose a series of questions that we think governments and strategists must begin to explore:

• What level and kind of American forward deployed forces will be necessary to deter the reappearance of age-old Asian rivalries, once the risk of war on the Korean peninsula has abated? And where should they be deployed?
• What caps would Japan be prepared to place on its military strength, if other powers in the region (especially China) are willing to place verifiable limits on their weapons acquisitions and deployments?
• Is there a process through which North and South Korea could be encouraged to reduce their military expenditures and alter the pattern of their deployments?
• If the United States, in close consultation with and consent of Taiwan, would halt or limit some of its weapons sales to the island, would Beijing be willing to halt development and/or deployment of systems that are particularly threatening to the island?
• Is the United States prepared to recognize the consequences of its possible NMD system upon China’s sense of security? What compensatory moves would Washington be prepared to undertake or accept?
• What compensatory actions would China be prepared to undertake, were Japan and the United States explicitly to state that the Defense Guideline Review does not contemplate Japan providing logistical support to the United States in case of an American involvement in the defense of Taiwan? For example, would such a commitment elicit a strong Chinese endorsement for the continuation of the US military presence in the western Pacific and of America’s bilateral treaties even after peace comes to Korea?

The raising of these questions underscores the difficult diplomatic challenges at hand. But if these questions are shunned, we believe a regional the arms race will prove to be unavoidable—especially if the Taiwan problem intensifies. And under those circumstances, the Grand Bargain would indeed be lost. Probably the United States is best positioned and has the greatest interest and responsibility to pursue these questions through a series of bilateral dialogues and arrangements with each of the countries involved. But any American effort must be reinforced through bilateral efforts of Japan with China, Taiwan with China, South Korea with the North, and the ASEAN states with China. To achieve a solution, each country would have to abandon its preferred position in order to reach a comprehensive series of agreements in which each country would feel more secure than it will if the arms race unfolds.

To repeat, this presents a conceptual challenge of great magnitude. It would build upon the Grand Bargain and go beyond it. If the leaders of the region can be persuaded to begin to think through these currently unanswerable questions, they would find themselves on an altered trajectory, having to consider how to create an improved regional security architecture through a series of new mutual accommodations.