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The New Administration and East Asia

Yoichi Funabashi

The following remarks were made by Yoichi Funabashi to the 2001 annual meeting of the Trilateral Commission in London. Yoichi Funabashi is Columnist and Chief Diplomatic Correspondent of Asahi Shimbun.

I very much appreciate both Gen. Scowcroft and Ambassador Hills illuminating the new directions and thinking of the new Administration in a clear and succinct way. At the same time, I cannot help but feel we are still in the midst of the presidential campaign because both of them characterize the “dream team” of the new Administration in a bit too one-dimensional and glorious way. I have detected different tones and sounds coming from some of the new Administration’s agencies, although it is not a “cacophony.”

Korea. It was certainly encouraging to see President Bush receive President Kim Dae Jung in a very timely fashion, but at the same time, there are some different signals emanating from Washington. Mr. Scowcroft mentions that eventually the Bush Administration will negotiate with Pyongyang. I agree. But I am concerned about the pace and modalities with which the new Administration will pursue this engagement. Not all of the previous Administration’s foreign policies were wrong, and I think one of the major achievements of the Clinton Administration was its engagement with North Korea since 1994 through the Agreed Framework, KEDO, and the “Perry process.” Asians are still uneasy about potential sudden changes in the processes and modalities of the United States’ engagement policy with Pyongyang. Many Asians felt the North-South summit talks and the Clinton Administration’s dispatch of Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang were too fast-paced. They actually felt relieved that President Clinton did not go to Pyongyang.

China and Japan. It is very encouraging to see the new U.S. Administration trying to redress what has been called a “China-tilt” policy, particularly in the latter part of the Clinton Administration. But now the Chinese are worried that the new Administration will perhaps push a “Japan-tilt” policy too far. I personally have heard this concern from my Chinese friends. The question here is not whether the Administration should pursue a China-tilt or Japan-tilt policy, but instead how the new Administration views Japan and China in the larger strategic picture. The United States’ policy should strengthen the relationship with Japan first as a stabilizer and then engage China.

Indonesia. Indonesia is increasingly likely to pose serious risks to all of us because of its role as the ballast of ASEAN and Southeast Asian regionalism, which underpin the security of the sea lanes through the Straits and South China Sea. What kind of policy will we see evolving from Washington with regard to Indonesia? The U.S. military role was neglected in the Clinton Administration, but military-to-military cooperation between the United States and Indonesia could be a stabilizing foundation on which the democratization process could gradually develop. The Indonesian military has been implicated in East Timor massacres so, understandably, there have been very strong inhibitions on the part of the U.S. Administration as well as Congress to work with the Indonesian military. But I think it is very important to explore new ways to make the Indonesian military more accountable and responsible.

East Asian Regionalism. On the economic and trade side, we heard some very lively, interesting discussion this morning, particularly after Fred Bergsten mentioned the significance of possible ramifications of emerging Asian regionalism for the global trading system. I strongly urge the new Administration not only to accept this new Asian regionalism, but also to encourage its development. It should be put within a much larger strategic picture, not just within the trade or liberalization picture. It would help develop the geopolitical space within which Japan and China could find much better ways to coexist. Korea—perhaps eventually North Korea—should also be incorporated into this emerging Asian regionalism.

Therefore, I have two concerns about the new U.S. Administration: some divergent views among the powerful players and unilateralist tendencies in foreign policymaking. And one final comment: I have seen the emergence of cultural anti-Americanism in Asia, as in Europe. Perhaps it is a reaction to the new thrust of the more right-wing Republicans (including the Christian right) in the U.S. Congress and in the U.S. public. That thrust very much tends to project onto the international scene these days. I wonder how mainstream Republicans cope with this challenge from the right wing, with this more unilateralist streak in the party.