International Terrorism and Extremism: Lessons from Chechnya

In the past, we underestimated the danger of Chechen separatism. Now, after having been faced not only with the danger of separatism, but also with the intimate ties between local and international terrorists, it is particularly painful that the world community lacks in-depth understanding of the threats posed to it by international terrorism and religious extremism. Therefore, my presentation will analyze some of the lessons we have learned from countering terrorism.

Separatism, Terrorism, and Human Rights in the Caucasus
To begin with, in 1996, Russia granted de facto full state independence to Chechnya, withdrawing militia units and troops and dismantling all federal structures. However, those steps failed to bring real independence to Chechnya because the power vacuum was immediately filled by political extremists, “soldiers of fortune,” and fanatics from Afghanistan, the Middle East, and other regions. Ethnic cleansing was unleashed. According to the last census held in 1989, the Republic’s population stood at 1,270,000 people, including 336,000 ethnic Russians. But by the time the counter-terrorist operation was undertaken in the fall 1999, there were only 20,000 Russians left in Chechnya, while the Chechen population did not exceed 500,000 people out of a total of one million Chechens living in Russia.

With the rise of the Dudayev–Maskhadov regime, executions at town squares, decapitations, and attempts to restore law and order on the basis of shariah perturbed both the population of the neighboring Republics and the Chechen people themselves. There is evidence that, in almost eight years of Dudayev– Maskhadov rule, more than 21,000 Russian civilians were murdered and over 46,000 people were forced into slave labor. In 1995–99, as many as 2000 hostages were deported to Chechnya from other Russian regions.

One can ask, Where was Europe? Where were all those who are so concerned today with human rights in Chechnya? Confident of their impunity, Ichkeria’s leaders did not limit themselves to separatist objectives. They fell under the influence of such personalities as the Jordanian-born guerilla commander Khattab and set themselves the goal of further dismembering Russia. The bandits became impudent to the point that they invaded the neighboring Republic of Daghestan four times, which is—and I wish to emphasize this fact—a Muslim-populated region.

Then came the bombing of apartment houses in a number of Russian cities, including Moscow, that took the lives of over a thousand peaceful citizens. Extremists declared openly that their goal was to extend their influence over the territories between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. At that stage, it then occurred to us at last that, if the terrorist bases on Chechnya’s soil were not demolished, the escalation of violence could attain unpredictable proportions and we took the necessary measures. But when terrorists are beaten they immediately invoke their human rights, demand protection for themselves, and appeal to international organizations to come to their rescue.

Within this context I wish to remind you that the regime that wielded power in the Chechen Republic did not merely trample under foot Russia’s constitutional law and challenge the territorial integrity of our state, but was also criminal under international law. Measures backed by the Maskhadov regime—including in the sphere of criminal punishment, for instance, dismemberment—were not only crimes punishable under the Russian Criminal Code, but also violated the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and so on. By their legislation and actions, Ichkeria’s leaders demonstrated that the accepted rules of the civilized world held no authority for them.

Terrorism Beyond Chechnya
It should also be understood that what has been happening in Chechnya is a part of a broader process of activating extreme forces in the Near and Middle East. What is going on, for instance, in Afghanistan? This country has already surpassed the whole of Latin America in drug output. Protected by the Taliban movement, extremist organizations find refuge there to propagate terror as a means of political struggle. Afghanistan has become a source of threats to stability in Central Asia. The region has been witnessing a sharp rise in the activities of such extremist groups as the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, the Afghan “Jamiat-i-Islami-ul Tulaba,” and the “Hizb-ut-Tahrir” Party, which, in the pursuit of establishing an Islamic caliphate, has involved the direct invasion of the territories of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as was the case last August.

The situation is very grave. Khattab, Maskhadov, Basaev, and their followers are not merely bandits. They are international terrorists dreaming to impose their will on the whole world, dreams which they openly stated in 1999 before the aggression against Dagestan. First comes the northern Caucasus, followed by the Transcaucasus, and then Central Asia. They plan to establish advanced strongholds to back their offensives throughout the world—from the Philippines to Bosnia—and Chechnya was to play a key role. So Chechen terrorism is not only Russia’s headache. This is evident from the many statements of separatist leaders. An archive belonging to a major Chechen band has been captured recently. One of the tapes features an address to Muslims by a British national, introducing himself from Manchester (his father is an African and mother is from west India). He says, among other things: “When we win the war, as in Afghanistan, we will establish a total Islamic law in Chechnya, Dagestan, and throughout the north Caucasian region. And further—in Moscow, New York, and Washington.”

For unknown reasons, unmasked xenophobia and anti-Semitism displayed by gang leaders of Ichkeria have been ignored by many people in the West. One of them, Arbi Baraev, who is still fighting in Chechnya and known for his order to decapitate three Britons and a New Zealander in 1998, has stated publicly: “Jews must be killed, no matter where they are, since the prophet Mohammed left the behest that Jews must be killed.”

Islam and Extremism in Chechnya
It is necessary to use the term “religious extremism” with utmost care when it concerns Islam as a world religion. Otherwise there is a tendency to equate the categories of fundamentalism—religious coloring—and extremism—political coloring. The Council of Muftis of Russia has discerned two main features distinguishing extremists from true believers: the negation of fundamental Islamic traditions; and the mentality of exclusion to the point of assuming the right to infringe on the rights of others. These characteristics have become dominant in the public life of Chechnya during the Dudayev–Maskhadov rule.

In reality, Russia is not waging a war with religious fundamentalists. Khattab, Basaev, and their followers do not have any real relation to “fundamental” Islam in its true meaning. Have you ever seen a true Muslim believer commit massive violations of shariah, such as swearing on the Koran in the name of Allah, entering a mosque with arms, or killing muftis? Almost ten imams were killed in Chehnya in recent months; there were also killings of imams during the Maskhadov rule. And how should one react to the fact that almost 60 percent of foreigners taken hostage were Muslims, which is strictly forbidden by the Koran? The Ichkeria leaders are no religious “fundamentalists.” They are marginals waving the banner of Islam. The present mufti of Chechnya, Shamaev, testifies that the following motto was very popular among Maskhadov’s entourage: “Oil for the upper class, Islam for the lower class.”

Confronting Terrorism in Chechnya and Beyond
Of course, the Chechen problem exists, and a lot of time and effort will be needed for its solution. We understand very well that it can only be resolved through political and economic measures. Such measures are the focus of the latest decisions by the President of Russia to reduce the number of troops in Chechnya, form a republican government, and increase financing for the restoration of the Republic. To simply abandon everything there and withdraw would create another vacuum and provide a new foothold for aggression against Russia. We cannot allow this. The threat coming from this terrorist enclave has taught our citizens a great deal, which is why the number of Russian people in favor of keeping Chechnya as a part of Russia has grown. This opinion was shared by only 25 percent of the population in October 1997; now the percentage is almost 60 percent. It is no coincidence that the number of those in Russia who favor the force operation is also high: the latest polls show that this course is supported by 47 percent of the population (it was 46 percent last November). The portion of the Russian elite holding similar views is even greater—almost 63 percent.

Chechnya is first a problem for Russia. But in a wider context, the danger of terrorism and religious extremism, the formation of such enclaves, constitute our common problem and our common risk. In this connection I cannot but note the adoption in Great Britain of a new law against terrorism, which may result in the closure of a whole range of organizations involved in terrorist activities, including those that are supporting Chechen separatists. This law is of practical significance for Russia. We circulate documents concerning terrorist acts in Chechnya to the British on a regular basis. On more than one occasion, we have drawn attention to the existence of information centers and organizations collecting financial resources that support Chechen separatism, banditry, and terrorism. We count very much on London to pay heed to our arguments and broaden the list of organizations to include those that have been helping the Chechen terrorists in material terms.