There were a few comments made to which I would like to react. One is the distinction between soft power and other power, that is, if the Europeans have a special strategy for pursuing objectives that may be more effective than the American strategy.

Now, if it means that Americans want to use force in every circumstance as a solution to every problem, that is, of course, accurate, but I don't think any serious American policymaker believes that force is a desirable application of American power, and anybody would prefer to use non-military means to military means. The issue, to be clear, is, first of all, to define what the problem is and secondly, to decide what is the most effective means of dealing with it. The best strategy is one in which there is a combination of soft power with other power in reserve, but I think we will not get to any understanding with Europe if Europe believes that it has the moral and elegant and smooth way of solving the problems and these rough Americans trying to throw their weapons around are going to impose everything by force.

On that basis, there will be no real progress in improving cooperation. Some of the difficulties are caused by the fact that America conducts itself like a traditional 19th century state. In other words, it believes it has national security interests, which it is ready to defend. You can argue about the definition of these interests. They may be more or less adequate, but the European countries are in the process of giving up a good part of their sovereignty and they are caught between their past when they also behave like on the current American premises and their future which they have great difficulty reaching.

Therefore, European political leaders find themselves with a public whose readiness to sacrifice their lives for their state is much less than in the United States, and this forces them into a different approach on those two levels of a different conception of their sovereignty and a different conception of the willingness of their publics to sacrifice.

Let me turn to the issues that require cooperative solutions and which can really be solved only by cooperative solutions. One of them is proliferation, including the issue of Iran. Any foreign policy issue needs several levels of analysis, which will affect the definition of the problem. Second, the definition of the strategy with which we are dealing with the problem. Third, means of getting consensus among the people who have to carry it out. And, fourth, means of getting other countries to associate with them.

On the issue of Iran, it is probably true that we fully agree on the objective. We want an Iran that has no military nuclear capacity, and I think we certainly agree that a diplomatic outcome to this is highly desirable. It's probably also true, and I certainly believe that, that it would be best if we could achieve this objective by joint action and it's probably also true that we can't achieve it unless there is united action.

But having said all of that, we also have to ask ourselves what is the probability that this diplomatic effort succeeds and above all what is the probability that this diplomatic effort succeeds without the prospect of some severe sanctions at the end of it if it doesn't succeed? That is the key issue that is before us. If it can be
done by negotiations between us and Europe and by even a participation of America in these negotiations, there is no problem.

The problem really lies in the more likely contingency that it appears that at some point down the road the objective cannot be achieved or cannot be achieved in a way that is conclusive. If that is the case, then I can see that severe disagreements could arise and they really will not be able to be answered unless we have some conception of what a world of essentially unrestricted proliferation will look like, because if Iran gets nuclear weapons, where does one draw the line?

A point will be reached in a measurable period when the nuclear issue will be out of control. Now, having had to manage deterrence in a two-power world, the idea of how you conduct deterrence in a 30-power world is frightening, knowing all the uncertainties we had in the two-power world and the difficulty of assessing the dangers and with how much anguish and some luck we all navigated it in all the administrations that had to deal with it.

We have seen in the case of Pakistan how a supposedly friendly country can distribute nuclear technology around the world. Imagine 20 countries doing that. What do we in this room think will be done if a nuclear weapon explodes in Moscow, New York, Delhi, London, anywhere, and instead of 2,000 or 3,000 people being killed, 50,000 to 100,000 people get killed and all civil order breaks down?

What will that do to the public perceptions in each society of the predictability of life in which you have to build society? What demands will then arise to bring this danger under control, cost what it may, because one doesn't want to live with this danger? Once we have answered that question to ourselves, then we can work backwards to what we should do now. But we have to take care that the diplomacy approach to Iran is not just the way to get through the Bush Administration and its alleged propensity for violent action.

But if a serious effort brings this to an end and I think we and Americans have an obligation to work with it seriously, I would be pleasantly surprised if we did not have to face somewhere in the next two or three years the questions I've put, namely, what do we do now when we have not achieved our objective?

Let's take the Palestinian issue. I believe that the Palestinian issue requires close cooperation between Europe and the United States, but not on the basis that one often hears in Europe—let America bring pressure on Sharon and then all will be well, and let's sort of impose a '67 border solution and let America do the heavy lifting by taking on the Israeli problem.

Now my view, based on having talked to many of the key people, is that a political solution of the Palestinian problem is conceivable and that one could today more or less draw a map where the lines would be. One could conceive how that would end with some mutual adjustment of territory, but there are two psychological problems.

Israel has to get over the psychological trauma of being actually willing to give up a significant part of the settlements, which I think is implied in the policy that Sharon is carrying out. But it is a traumatic event for Israel. The Palestinians have to get over the psychological trauma of having to give up the right to return in some fashion and that at the end of the process, there is a real Israeli state and not the shell of something that they can keep pushing against and gradually bring down.

These are the two psychological obstacles. American/European cooperation on the Palestinian issue would be extremely helpful if we could agree on what the outline of that settlement would look like and, if in addition to whatever suggestions America makes to Israel, the Europeans would not present themselves as an alternative to the American approach, but as a complement to a joint approach. What the Palestinian leaders need is a sense that there is no better alternative coming.
As long as the outside countries are telling them that there is a better solution, they do not have the moral framework or the political framework within which to operate. So the biggest European contribution is not, with all due respect to my European friends here, to push America to push Sharon, because I think Sharon is on the road that has to be taken, namely, that all the settlements on the other side of the dividing line are subject to abandonment. Their role is to encourage the Arab countries into making the adjustments they have to make. If we could achieve that degree of European/American cooperation, then one could imagine bringing along some moderate Arab countries that in turn would make it easier for Palestinian leaders to make the adjustments that most of them recognize they have to make, but find it very difficult to make on a purely national basis.

I'm hopeful on the Arab/Israeli issue. I think it is, from the negotiating point of view, closer to a solution than I have seen it in a long time, but the political framework has yet to be created, and it should not be defined as American pressure on Israel, but as joint pressure on both parties.

I want to make only two more points and I'll make them very briefly. One is that the advocacy of the freedom agenda, the advocacy of democracy as a solution during the national problems, seems to show great promise in a few places but it is something which we ought to discuss with some greater precision as we go around the world in terms of defining what do we mean by it.

What do we want to achieve in specific countries? It is often argued, and probably correctly, that not enough was done to promote democracy in earlier periods, but if you look at the case of Iran, you can prove both propositions. You can argue that there were some periods in the Shah's rule when western governments, especially the American Government, were too permissive, but you can also argue that there was a period when the American Government was so insistent that it brought about Khomeini. How to strike that balance is an important subject for real European/American discussion.

The third topic I want to raise simply as a problem is the future of energy consumption in the world. When you have countries like China growing at the rate it does, when India joins that at a lesser but still a significant rate, it's mathematically clear the demand is growing infinitely faster than supply. Therefore the real contest in the world may be over access to energy and the great game may no longer be territorial, but the direction of pipelines.

While one can imagine that supply can be increased, it is very difficult to get it into the same place. At the same time, it is hard to imagine that major countries will permit themselves to be strangled by the market alone, if this is to be the evolution. I think some serious discussion among consumers is absolutely imperative about alternative supplies, access to energy, dealing with emergencies and further down the road maybe a dialogue with producers. If one looks for areas of real cooperation, this is one where the interests are congruent and the necessities are great.

My major point is that in the analysis of what we need of the problems we want to solve, there should be considerable congruence of trilateral interest and European/American interest and the capacity actually to do it due to the domestic evolutions of the different countries. That is not necessarily the case. So the question is really will the modern governments permit taking long-range views or will they all be driven by the need to avoid immediate domestic crisis? That seems to me to be, especially in European/American relations and, I hate to say it, largely on the European side, an overriding problem.

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