I want to try to add a somewhat different perspective from a former policymaker. My focus is on what the present situation of Islam and the rest of us means strategically and what it is we might be doing about it.

Muslims and Islamic countries represent about a fifth of the world's population and I think a larger share of its wealth. While bound together, as we've heard, by a single faith no less than Christian and Jews, they have differences in everything from worship patterns and beliefs to loyalties. Islam is thus not a monolithic opponent. Concern about us and the policies that it has been pursuing has been growing in the United States very rapidly, but in that sense the feeling is not necessarily one that is new or that has been solely developed as a result of 9/11. Those of us who preceded, in government, the Bush administration shared the same concerns. They've become sharpened, and to some extent I suspect that the fundamentalists have achieved a victory in calling attention to themselves and to the issues that they are putting forward, but the danger I think for us and for many non-Muslims is that we must be careful not to turn the war on terror into a war on Islam by the actions we take. And, indeed, it seems to me this is one of the major efforts the fundamentalists are pursuing. We've heard examples today and yesterday of how that might be happening.

I think it is also true, as we have heard in the opening statements by our Chairman, that fundamentalism is not a unique preserve of Islam. Islam and the Muslim world are of strategic importance to us and we must think strategically about how to deal with this issue.

More than fundamentalist terror has sharpened the question, and many of us remain concerned with Islam itself. There seems to be no serious vocation yet for the emergence of a modern pan-Islamic leadership, although we see increasing signs that at least some of that leadership is present and ready to move.

We are concerned, as many are in my country, about the sources of concern and, indeed, hate of the United States. I think my friend Dr. Telhami has given us an excellent review of his own research on how the Arab world looks at it. I would just reduce it to a brief taxonomy.

Certainly I would begin with the size and strength of the United States which has its impact not only in the Islamic world, but all around the world.

A second major factor is the question of the style of American presentation of itself and the way in which it conducts itself. We could go into a longer discussion of unilateralism and isolationism, of multilateralism and internationalism. I don't intend to do that, but I do intend to say that Iraq proved many things, and one is that at least in the aftermath it seems absolutely clear that going it alone or at least pretending to go it alone has serious costs, not only for us in the western world, but very heavily in the Islamic world. I think as well that the bigger the challenge, perhaps the more the role of others becomes significant in dealing with a set of critical issues.

I'm also concerned, as Dr. Telhami has been, about the issues of the substance of foreign policy. Getting policies right is, obviously, in the national interest and I would be the last to advocate that creating policies to attract support rather than to serve national interest or our principles is the appropriate way to proceed.
In the Middle East and in the Arab world there has been continued controversy since the post-World War II period about American policies. In recent decades, this has multiplied. The simplest expression of this has taken place in three areas, which I want to cover from a policy perspective.

The first and perhaps important is the Arab/Israeli peace. I want to discuss briefly Iraq and certainly Iran and the weapons of mass destruction issue. The three are clearly interrelated; progress in one I believe can help in the areas of the others. Failure in one or the other I think can make things more difficult for us.

I begin in the Arab/Israeli question where I thought that Dr. Kissinger had made his own brilliant presentation. We all know, in fact, with, I think, a great deal of precision what the final deal will have to involve, even if we haven't yet discovered the appropriate method for getting there.

The new factors on the scene are best epitomized by Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas, as we have heard. And I think it is important to look at the issues that surround both and what they bring to the table that epitomize a changed situation. I think they've opened up this set of issues for us for the future. Mr. Sharon seems dedicated to getting out of Gaza. He has, in fact, as a result taken a step that many of us who have watched Israel for years never believed would be possible. But he's made a choice between his own party becoming a prime minister without a party, having lost Likud, for several parties that don't have a prime minister, but clearly will support him on his withdrawal from Gaza and, I believe, are also committed fairly firmly to continuing toward a full two-state solution.

Sharon, of course, is not talking these days about the West Bank. But if he is successful in Gaza, he will have to face the question, as we all know, of what to do about the West Bank. If he continues, in fact, as I believe will be the case, not to have his party, then his options are very stark. He can either retire and turn the government over to his firm opponent, Mr. Netanyahu, or he can continue his legacy and work with the three parties, which will support him on that particular effort and he will truly become a Nixon in China.

While this is reduced to its simplest terms, I believe it is important, at least in present day Israeli politics, to understand Sharon in a new and different presentation than we have seen him before. One thing I might add is that he is partnered with a Palestinian who has at least begun to take the steps that I believe are necessary to bring the Palestinians firmly into the equation and to compliment what Mr. Sharon has done. No Israeli will tell you he is 100 percent satisfied with what the Palestinians have done, and I suspect that no Palestinian would echo his sentiments in the opposite direction, but nevertheless there has been remarkable progress in the light and, in fact, the lack of progress for four years.

What do I think is necessary and still lacking? I believe the U.S. role is critical. I think we are perhaps at one and the same time the necessary and sufficient condition, but, if we are not, I think we are certainly the necessary condition to bring the process forward. Until last week I remained deeply concerned that the United States was enthusiastic about Sharon in his old guise a year ago, but we never saw the same sense of commitment to what I have to call, at least temporarily, the new Mr. Sharon in the process. That's begun to turn around with Crawford, but we're not exactly there yet, and I believe very much that in this particular process much depends upon what the U.S. is prepared to do, whether we can in fact pursue the role that we have in the past and help to move this process further ahead.

Let me turn now briefly to Iraq. I'm not going to talk about how we got here. I am going to say that as Winston Churchill once said of the Americans, "Having tried very possible other alternative, they've now come up with a policy that just might work."

Iraqization is a centerpiece of this policy and the security side still remains perilous and difficult, and one doesn't see yet a positive horizon in that whole process.
Political elections have made, I think, a real step forward. Undermined a bit by tremendous difficulties, the Iraqis themselves are making final government formulation a fact of life rather than a pending issue. Nevertheless, I believe these have been critical and important forward steps. I believe here that it needs a boost, and, in the sense of the Trilateral Commission, it seems to me that regardless of our differences about how we got here, and I certainly have them, the important fact is that we have an opportunity as well as a challenge in the future of Iraq. I fault the administration for not pushing hard enough on the internationalization of the issue and, frankly, I fault our friends for not responding themselves to at least the obvious—that in the long run the failure in Iraq is going to affect you as much as it affects all of us in this country. And this is an important opportunity to move the question ahead, regardless of how we got here.

Turning very briefly to Iran, on which we could expand an entire afternoon, I'd like to focus only for a moment on the central issue of the question of weapons of mass destruction. Dr. Kissinger pointed out much more lucidly and much more extensively than I can the perils involved in another nuclear state in Iran. I tend to think that we share a common view with respect to both North Korea and Iran as potentially those who will finally destroy the NPT regime, and certainly in Iran my view is that it will lead to further proliferation in the region and beyond.

The fact of the life at the present time is that seemingly the United States and the E-3 in the European Union share a common view about the efforts that must be made to bring the Iranians along in a settlement of the question, and the really critical factor is that we haven't yet joined forces to make that happen. I think the basic and most fundamental steps that have to be taken are to assure the Iranians that, within the limits which I will describe, the world is ready to have them waste their money if they wish to do so on peaceful civil nuclear power, but that there must be no enrichment and no reprocessing. Even more, I think there must be the addition of an inspection system that has to be based, at a minimum, on what the United Nations Security Council provided for Iraq during the most important period there. Without that kind of guarantee and without that kind of a settlement, the Iranian nuclear program becomes a reality in the terms of what we all see pending, which is merely using the NPT as a springboard for weaponization.

There are other things that I think have to be added, and some of them were discussed earlier. There needs to be a regional security environment that can begin to give assurance, not only to Iran but to others in the area, that if they remain non-nuclear they can have support and international backing for threats that might be deployed against them. We understand that Iran may feel insecure. It lives in an insecure area, and we have to deal with that. The important point here in terms of regional security is that if, in fact, guarantees are prepared to be given to states which do not nuclearize in the area, we have begun to set the basis for a longer term regional solution, not only if Iran, God forbid, should nuclearize itself but if those guarantees can help with non-nuclearization in Iran.

There are two other areas that I think are important and I'll sketch just very briefly before I end. One of these is what other states are prepared to do in the same context, recognizing that the NTP imposed obligations to the nuclear states as well as the non-nuclear states. Here I think it is critically important that we take a very hard and positive look at the idea that the Director General of the IAEA has provided to all of us, that we take a five-year holiday or moratorium in production of highly enriched uranium and the separation of plutonium from whatever spent fuel it might come. This holiday would give an enormous impetus to our asking Iran, in effect, to take a similar holiday. It would also require another piece of activity which I think will be significant. It could bring the permanent five members of the Security Council together to deal with what must be an extremely important aspect of any offer to Iran. That offer must be complimented by a set of escalating sanctions over a period of time which the Iranians must be sure will take place, escalating sanctions that should go over a period of time up to and including a full oil embargo on Iran with plenty of time for the rest of the world to take it into account and deal with it in its own energy planning. Not a happy alternative, not an easy one, but I think it's extremely significant.
Finally, in addition, I think it is time to begin to resolve the U.S./Iranian differences. I think they need to be paced in accordance with the resolution of the nuclear problem. I agree with Dr. Kissinger on that point. But I think, in fact, that it is time for the United States to open discussions with Iran. We cannot, in fact, have a major effort from our side in the solution of the problem if we're not ready to do this. It's not a foregone conclusion that the Iranians are yet ready to accept this. If one looks at the checkered history of U.S. and Iranian relations, one finds that every time we have been ready, they have not. Every time they have been ready, we are not. But some day we're bound to strike it together.

Finally, let me say that in these three areas, as I've emphasized, there is an enormously important role for Trilateral understanding and cooperation. Indeed, in many of these particular instances, our friends in the EU are already deeply engaged. I would like to see our friends in Japan have a more significant role and certainly China as a member of the P-5 should understand the important strategic value of this particular set of issues for itself, for the future of its energy relationships and the future stability in the Middle East.

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